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PROLOGUE
After the American Indian male renounced allegiance to his
tribe, shot his last arrow, and accepted the plow, the federal official
said: "This act means that you have chosen to live the life of the white
man-and the white man lives by work. From the earth we must all
get our living .... Only by work do we gain a right to the land ... "I
After the American Indian female renounced allegiance to her
tribe, accepted the work bag and purse, the federal official said: "This
means you have chosen the life of the white woman-and the white
woman loves her home. The family and home are the foundation of
our civilization. 2
INTRODUCTION: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNS ARE MORE THAN
RACE ONLY
The usual constitutional concepts of racial equality, and the older
concepts of race as well as the evolving definitions, do not adequately
encompass the political and legal status of American Indians. Unique
equality issues arise from their indigenous status as tribal sovereigns.
The individual rights focus of race does not fit the collective political
right of American Indians. Constitutional law development in the
1 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, Doc. 89.94.04b, ATTORNEYS
AND AGENTS, COMPETENT INDIANS 5-6 (Central Classified File 1936-1937). Until 1924
American Indians were not automatically citizens of the United States.
2 Id. The naturalization ceremony for American Indian individuals to make
them citizens of the United States had "his" and "her" versions. See also 4 SMITHSO-
NIAN INST., HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 233 fig.1 (1988) (explaining a
typical ritual of admission to citizenship); infra Part II.B.
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United States has used race and gender as the core for discretely iden-
tifiable groups with an individual rights basis for equal protection.
3
American Indian/Native American 4 nations are a political entity sui
generis in the Constitution. They are neither states nor foreign na-
tions, nor another racially distinct minority.5 Since American Indians
are also racially distinct for some laws, any legal exploration involves
considering "when race is not race."'6 Thus, the unique collective
right that tribal sovereigns insist on retaining does not fit the usual
constitutional conversation about the individualized "who" and "what"
activities shall be cognizable and protected.
Indian law cases such as Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez7 clearly ex-
pose the tension between constitutional individual rights conceived in
an abstract sense and the tribe's right as a cultural and political com-
munity with distinct consensual values. In Martinez, an individual
member charged her Pueblo with gender discrimination under the
Pueblo's ordinance on membership qualifications." When a female
member sought declaratory and injunctive relief against enforcement
of a tribal ordinance denying membership in the tribe to children of
female members who married outside the tribe-while extending
membership to children of male members who married outside the
3 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (defer-
ring for another time the question of "whether prejudice against discrete and insular
minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry").
4 Either term is used by the indigenous peoples of the United States. For style
purposes, this Article will primarily use American Indian and Indian.
5 This statement on American Indian status does not aim to diminish the legiti-
macy of ethnic and racially distinct groups nor their grievances arising from having
been historically disfavored in the United States. The political status as sovereign
remains primary for indigenous peoples in the United States and outside the United
States in international law. As individuals and in specific contexts, American Indians
are treated as racial or ethnic minorities and entitled to rights and protections, e.g.,
inclusion in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to h-6 (2000), and the
federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bbl (2000).
6 When American Indian/Native American law is not law about race is a subject
of scholars' discourse and disagreement. See, e.g., Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not
"Strictly" Racial: A Response to "Indians as Peoples, "39 UCLA L. REv. 169 (1991); David
Williams, Sometimes Suspect: A Response to Professor Goldberg-Ambrose, 39 UCLA L. REv.
191 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Sometimes Suspect]; David C. Williams, The Borders of
the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REv. 759 (1991) [hereinafter
Williams, Indians as Peoples].
7 436 U.S. 49 (1978). For discussion of this case, see supra Part V.
8 Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 51.
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tribe-the tribe's sovereign immunity and the Indian Civil Rights Act
barred the suit.9
Undoubtedly, American Indians create dilemmas for advocates of
equal protection to all individuals who may also affirm the right of
American Indian tribes to their culturally based form of government.
The contemporary situation of many tribes with the nation's highest
rates of poverty and least provided for in education, housing, and em-
ployment opportunities provokes empathic concern.10 Carol E.
Goldberg points out the difficulties when individual rights "can trump
the interests of others, the good of society, and the will of the majority
because they are understood to derive from moral principles indepen-
dent of any social conceptions of the good."1 Goldberg succinctly
states the difficulty for American Indians: "[G] rounding what is essen-
tially a group rights claim on the rights of individual group members
commits one to an individual rights critique of the group itself, a re-
sult that may tear at tribal cultures which do not privilege individual
rights in the same way United States law does."'12 Knowledgeable dis-
course about "rights" in the Indian context requires that discussants
not familiar with Indian law understand the legal and historical con-
text in which that law was generated.
Two conditions have affected the quality of American Indian con-
text since the first European contacts, and these continue into Euro-
American constitutionalism. First, the indigenous nations are the
original sovereigns within the United States' borders. As "preconstitu-
tional" and "extraconstitutional" governments, 13 not arms of the state
or federal governments, the tribal sovereigns do not conform to the
popular expectation of how federalism is configured. Second, espe-
cially for purposes of this symposium on racial equality, the tribal gov-
ernments also have responsibility to protect the rights of individuals,
members and non-members, who are subject to tribal law. These two
conditions place American Indians in their collective power as sover-
9 Id. at 59, 72.
10 U.S. CENSUS BuREru, SUMMARY FILE 3 (2000) (noting the average poverty rate
from 1998 to 2000 for Native Americans was 25.9%, the highest of any racial
subgroup).
11 Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitalization, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
889, 889-90 (2003). Goldberg provides an insightful analysis of how individual rights
standards can affect or defeat federal laws to revitalize tribal governments. She con-
siders whether individual rights must be protected in order for tribal governments to
secure economic growth, respect from non-Indian governments, and protection from
congressional attacks on tribal sovereignty and culture.
12 Id.
13 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 112 (1987).
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eigns and as individuals outside the usual constitutional discourse rep-
resented in constitutional law casebooks.
14
Indigenous nations have the only collective right expressed in the
Constitution. The Article I authority for Congress to "regulate com-
merce . . . with the Indian tribes" 15 and the Article II power of the
President to make treaties 16 anchor the federal recognition of the tri-
bal sovereigns. 17 Indian law,18 as the law made by the federal legisla-
ture and executive, clearly involves a tension, if not explicit conflict in
specific instances, between the collective political interest of a tribe in
contest with the constitutional framework of individual rights. Conse-
quently, in contemporary constructs of racial equality, American Indi-
ans do not fit neatly into historical views on race and equality. Nor
have constitutional scholars and critical race theorists dealt adequately
with the incongruity of Indian status in the federalism or constitu-
tional context because they form a type of "race plus."
First, I will set the colonial context for equality that was anchored
in a narrow white male model as the principal civic actor. Second, the
discussion proceeds to the political status of American Indians, the
basis for the nation-to-nation relations that secured in treaties the
lands and resources that benefited non-Indians. Historically, this po-
litical relationship meant the individual rights in the constitutional
foundation did not include the indigenous peoples of the United
States who, until 1924, were a non-citizen "other." Third, this Article
explores the cultural difference between indigenous and constitu-
tional visions of individual rights and community. Fourth, is a descrip-
tion of the efforts to remake Indians into a race and assimilate their
14 See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(15th ed. 2004).
15 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
17 Other applicable constitutional provisions include: "Indians not taxed" to be
excluded from those counted for representation in Congress or apportioning direct
taxes, id. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2 (reinstating the exclusion of "Indians
not taxed"); the war power, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; and power over federal property, id.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Indian Commerce and the Treaty Clauses have continuously
been the most relevant for the foundational law of Indian law in the Supreme Court
and Congress.
18 "Indian law" is distinct from the laws made by tribes to govern themselves,
which represents an expanding area of activity, as tribal governments formalize their
laws, establish judicial structures, and publish their laws (providing material for schol-
ars). See the University of New Mexico School of Law Tribal Law Journal, at http://
tlj.unm.edu, the only online journal that focuses on law made within indigenous na-
tions in the United States and internationally.
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governments into federalism. The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)19 is
the key congressional tool to impose a general constitutional standard
for individual rights and how tribes govern under their laws. Fifth,
this Article discusses the Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez case, which
demonstrates the cultural disparity between the individual rights
model of the ICRA and the political right of the tribe to self-determi-
nation. This Part includes some of the viewpoints in disagreement
with the Supreme Court's holding as permissible the Pueblo's differ-
ent treatment of female members who "outmarry," that is, marry non-
members. The presumptions and risks when outsiders judge the au-
thenticity of indigenous cultures that created internal law are briefly
discussed in this fifth Part.
The conclusion affirms that the retained power of tribal sover-
eigns for self-governance and self-determination is the most important
right for American Indians. Though American Indians are now citi-
zens entitled to equal protection and due process, this individualistic
theory is limited in force to protect culturally distinct governments
built on values of consensual relations.
I. THE COLONIAL MALE MODEL OF EQuALry
In the colonial model of citizenship and equality, the persons
worthy of civic participation and rights were Anglo-American males
privileged because of their education and wealth. Not included, even
in the post-constitutional period, were all women, African slaves (only
three-fifths of a person), and American Indians who had not re-
nounced their allegiance to their tribal nations. One can appreciate
the degrees with which constitutional law has moved away from the
colonial view of equal protection and racial equality if we put aside the
misleading visions from nostalgia and mythology about the founding
of the new Anierican republic.
The pre- and post-constitutional dialogues in the formation of
the republic continued this limited conception of equality as the privi-
leged "white" male. Civic leadership could not be entrusted to the
unruly "masses" of Anglo-American unprivileged males, lacking suffi-
cient education and property. The "unprivileged" males became a
real and present danger in insurrections such as Shays's Rebellion of
1786 in Massachusetts. 20 The Shaysites were debt-pressed farmers and
19 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000).
20 THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY 141-42 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. ed.,
1983). Shays began his armed challenge to the state when his band of insurgents
confronted the Massachusetts militia sent to protect the State Supreme Court in Sep-
tember 1786. Shays's band forced the court to adjourn. Then, with another insur-
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others who took up arms to prevent creditors from exercising their
contractual rights,2' and similar Shaysite actions spread to other
states.22 The dysfunction of the states was a primary cause of the weak-
ened central government that was unable to raise taxes or regulate the
interstate squabbles that impeded the national economic
development.
Thus, spreading social disorder doomed the national system of
the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union and forced exi-
gent action to save the republic. Paul Johnson has summarized the
situation:
[I] ndividual states carried out all kinds of sovereign acts which logi-
cally belong to a central authority-they broke foreign treaties and
federal law, made war on Indians, built their own navies, and some-
times did not trouble themselves to send representatives to Con-
gress. They taxed each other's trade while failing to pay what they
had promised to the Congressional coffers. That, of course, was at
the root of the collapse of credit and the runaway inflation. All
agreed: things could not go on this way.
23
The leading historian of this period, Gordon S. Wood, noted that the
"anarchical excesses of the period seemed to be backfiring, resulting
in evils even worse than licentiousness." 24 According to Wood, the
gent leader, Luke Day, in December 1786, he assembled a rebel force of 1200 men
who outnumbered the state militia. The Governor had to call for a short-term mobili-
zation to assemble 4400 men to deal with the insurrection, which unsuccessfully at-
tacked the federal arsenal in Springfield. It took until the end of February 1787 for
the uprising to be suppressed.
21 PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 177 (1983) (reporting
that James Wilson of Pennsylvania stated that Shays's Rebellion revealed "on what a
perilous tenure we hold our freedom and independence"). See generally DAVID P.
SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELLION: THE MAKING OF AN AGRARIAN INSURRECTION 19 (1980)
(describing the historical and political forces of Shays's Rebellion); CURTIS P. NET-
TLES, THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIONAL ECONOMY, 1775-1815, at 97 (1962) (locating the
cause of Shays's Rebellion in the heavy land and poll taxes states enacted after the
Revolution).
22 ONUF, supra note 21, at 178-79; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 325-26 (1969) (noting the discontent of people
throughout the states).
23 PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 183 (1997).
24 WOOD, supra note 22, at 465. For the history of tribal relations with the na-
tional and state governments, including the impact of the anarchy on the constitu-
tional processes and decision to exclude states from relations with the tribes, see
Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court's Indian Law Decisions: Deviations From Consti-
tutional Principles and the Crafting ofJudicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 405
(2003), and Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REv.
1055, 1064-98 (1995), on pre- and post-revolutionary dealings between American In-
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Federalists feared the uneducated, greedy, lesser men who had
plunged the states and the union into a depression aggravated by vio-
lence and anarchy.
25
A new Constitution was the remedy, and the political dialogues
for its formation favored leadership of the Anglo-American male elite.
Nonetheless, the new social contract, the Constitution, constrained
even the voting power of the elite by denying a direct vote for Sena-
tors (later amended) 26 and for the President.27 Contract law was sanc-
tified and became constitutionally protected to prevent the abuses
from state governments that capitulated to the Shaysite demands to
alter the contract rights of creditors.28 Federalists articulated the
characteristics for the elite who should form the leadership of the new
constitutional republic: social superiority based on education, experi-
ence, wealth and connections, demonstrating eligibility for political
leadership. 29 Being a white male mattered, but alone did not suffice
for civil participation.
For much of our national experience the constitutional republic
has used the male and individual rights as the benchmarks for how
the political space will protect others. Individual rights and equality
have expanded by degrees, sometimes idiosyncratically, to protect Af-
rican Americans as full persons, women, all ethnic minorities, and per-
sons with disabilities through the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
question of 2004 to guide us as we resolve questions of individual ine-
qualities is: as the benchmark moved to an able-bodied Anglo-American hetero-
sexual male, how does any person claiming rights fit this measure?
The retreat from laws that affirmatively protect historically disfa-
vored ethnic minorities and women is one response to long-held privi-
leges now threatened. The status of tribes as political entities is
ensnared in the regressive response to law regimes to create equality.
dians and the Euro-Americans, including the tension between states' rights versus
central government monopoly in relationships with Indians.
25 WOOD, supra note 22, at 476.
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing for two Senators per state, "chosen by the
Legislature thereof"), superseded by id. amend. XVII (providing for direct election "by
the people").
27 Id. art. II, § I (providing for the electoral college system).
28 Id. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall.., make any... law impairing the Obligation of
Contracts.").
29 WOOD, supra note 22, at 479-80 (describing the Federalists' difficulty in per-
suading others that these leadership qualifications would not duplicate British elitism
based on wealth, social rank, and titles of nobility).
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II. AMERICAN INDIANS, THE POLITICAL COLLECTIVE, AND INDIVIDUALS
A. Contemporary Tribal Sovereigns
American Indians differ from the other minorities in having col-
lective political rights. The twenty-first century involves some 562 tri-
bal sovereigns, the political actors in the nation-to-nation relationship
with the federal government 30 that was affirmed in the early Marshall
Court decisions. The issues most germane to racial equality will be
discussed in this Article and should not be considered a full scholarly
discussion of the issues and doctrines that form the complexity of In-
dian law.3 1 As constructed by the first Supreme Court, the political
relationship was exclusively federal-tribal because of the federal mo-
nopoly in the Constitution.3 2 The Constitution was designed to pre-
vent the states from endangering national interests through their
idiosyncratic state relations and wars with Indians, which had endan-
gered the union during the Articles of Confederacy period. 33
In the foundational cases in Indian law, the Supreme Court held
that the Cherokee Nation was a "domestic dependent nation."34 The
Cherokee Nation constituted a distinct political community, with its
own territory in which Cherokee laws applied, and where laws of the
30 The list of tribes in this political relationship is published annually. For the
latest, see Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services, 68 Fed. Reg.
68,180 (U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs Dec. 5, 2003).
31 See generally ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NA-
TIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2003); DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (4th ed. 1998) for a
fuller exploration of the doctrines and issues comprising Indian law.
32 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (4 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 543, 587-88 (1823). Justice Marshall also construed the
British relationships with the American Indians, interpreted as "conquest," thus creat-
ing a successor's monopoly for the federal government to acquire lands from Ameri-
can Indians. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 583-84. All other acquisitions or titles, by states or
individuals, were invalid. Id. at 604-05. For the constitutional process and decision
to exclude states from relations with the tribes because of the conflicts over the west-
ern lands, see Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 405.
33 Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 438-53. The Articles of Confederation re-
flected the dominance of state power and restricted the national government to the
powers expressly delegated to the United States in Congress. ARTS. OF CONFEDERA-
TION art. II (1781). On relations with the American Indians, the provision reflected
the states' unwillingness to exclude a state role. Congress had the sole and exclusive
power to "regulat[e] the trade and manag[ement] of all affairs with the Indians, not
members of any of the States, provided that the legislative right of any State within its
own limits be not infringed or violated." Id. art. IX; see also Clinton, supra note 24, at
1103-47 (discussing extensively the struggles with states as Congress attempted to im-
plement a national policy).
34 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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state had no force.35 These early cases, for good and bad from the
point of view of the indigenous peoples of the United States, provided
the concepts in federal common law that continuously inform con-
temporary Indian law decisions.3 6 Counterfactual claims that the
Euro-Americans or British conquered the tribes are stated as law facts
and conclusion, although no tribe has surrendered its sovereignty to
any European or Anglo-American power. For a variety of reasons,
some pragmatic and some from international law, the initial Europe-
ans and then the United States engaged in political relationships with
the tribes and made treaties to secure land and peaceful relation-
ships.3 7 Since the Supreme Court decisions in the early constitutional
period, Indian law has vacillated between two national policy ap-
proaches: to respect the political autonomy of tribes and their right to
self-determination and to assimilate Indians into the presumed ho-
mogenous mainstream.38
Continuously, two law theories have informed the laws on tribal
autonomy and assimilation made by Congress and the Supreme
Court. The earliest theory held that tribal sovereignty was to be recog-
nized and self-determination enabled through acts like the Indian
Country statute. 39 Subsequently and collaterally crafted was the fed-
eral trust theory, an imposed relationship from federal common law
35 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 560.
36 In constructing the immense federal common law on American Indians, the
Court developed special canons of construction: ambiguous expressions must be re-
solved in favor of the Indian parties concerned, Indian treaties must be interpreted as
the Indians themselves would have understood them, and Indian treaties must be
liberally constructed in favor of the Indians. Charles F. Wilkinson & John M.
Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as the Water Flows, or Grass
Grows upon the Earth"--How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CAL. L. REv. 601, 608-19 (1975);
see also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (construing a treaty as the
"unlettered people" understood it). The Supreme Court in the latter part of the twen-
tieth century began to deviate from these special canons as the Court started recon-
structing state power.
37 See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 58-74 (1982)
(covering the nation-to-nation relations and treaties between the Indian tribes and
the emerging U.S. republic in the Revolutionary War period and the early constitu-
tional period).
38 The cycles are summarized in CLINroN ET AL., supra note 31, at 18-50.
39 Indian Country as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 includes:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any pat-
ent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all
dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments,
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that makes the "dependent" Indians the beneficiary of the federal
trustee's power over tribal resources, the res or corpus. 40 As the basis
for lawmaking, both of these theories have produced law, rarely with
tribal consent, that controls the scope of tribal sovereignty. The "ple-
nary power" of Congress in Indian affairs broadly extends to the au-
thority to terminate tribes, according to the Supreme Court.
41
Sustaining these theories and the derivative policies are the Constitu-
tion, treaties until 1871,42 agreements, statutes, and tribal-federal con-
tracts. Thus, Title 25 of the U.S. Code and Code of Federal
Regulations focus on American Indians, manifesting the unique politi-
cal relationship between tribes and the national government.
The sovereignty and trust theories include the cultural imperial-
ism and subordination intrinsic in the history of racial and gender
inequality. With American Indians the cultural superiority is explicit
as law, as cases early in the republic's foundation from the Marshall
Court continue to serve as the generative source in Indian law. For
example, in Johnson v. M'Intosh, the Supreme Court proclaimed Euro-
pean "discovery" and "conquest" of indigenous peoples accompanied
by the bestowing on them benefits of "civilization and Christianity. '43
The Court justified denying the American Indians full fee title to their
lands, as
the tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages,
whose occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly
from the forest. To leave them in possession of their country, was to
leave the country a wilderness; to govern them as distinct people
was impossible, because they were as brave and as high spirited as
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000). The Indian Country statute was passed in 1948 to resolve
tribal jurisdictional issues. Act ofJune 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683, 757. The Allot-
ment Policy of 1887 opened Indian lands to non-Indian settlers. General Allotment
Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388. The resulting "checkerboard" of non-Indian fee
land, carved out of former tribal lands yet adjacent to retained tribal lands, has pro-
duced problems as to which government-tribal, state, or federal-has jurisdiction.
The Indian Country Statute, § 1151, has never been amended.
40 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 219-28 (1983).
41 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903), the Supreme Court force-
fully declared that congressional plenary power, without express constitutional roots,
allowed Congress to unilaterally abrogate treaties for the benefit of the Indians who
objected to the violation of treaty provisions.
42 See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2000) (ending the making of treaties). While the United
States can no longer make treaties with Indians, however, many of the subsequent
agreements and relevant statutes were effectively in the form of treaties.
43 21 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 543, 572-73 (1823).
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they were fierce, and were ready to repel by arms every attempt on
their independence.
4 4
Reflective of the cultural superiority in the federal law, in Indian
law the Supreme Court, especially recently, has eviscerated the juris-
dictional authority inherent for any sovereign to govern the actors
and events within its territory. The Court has shifted from the geo-
graphical jurisdiction in the early Marshall decisions to a racialized
and crazy-quilt configuration of tribal, state, and federal jurisdiction.
45
The result is that no non-Indian (i.e., "white" individual) in his or her
person or property shall be subject to tribal laws and courts, except in
certain narrow exceptions.4 6 Justice Rehnquist made "racializing" ex-
plicit in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe when the Court introduced
an assumption that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indi-
ans.4 7 The Major Crimes Act of 1885 had already removed criminal
jurisdiction for major felonies from both the tribes and the states.
48
Absent any substantive sources for the assumption, the Oliphant Court
held that the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
charged with misdemeanor crimes on the reservation was inconsistent
44 Id. at 590.
45 See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 180-81, 224-26 (4th ed.
2004) (offering helpful charts on the crazy-quilt of criminal and civil jurisdiction).
46 The Court began in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564-65 (1981), to
remove tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians hunting on non-Indian fee lands within
tribal reservation boundaries. The Court used the terms "nonmembers" and "non-
Indians" in this case and has not been consistent in its terminology. Id. at 550-51. In
Montana, the Court ignored the earlier Indian law derived from the early Marshall
Court and reverted to a presumption against tribal jurisdiction unless two exceptional
circumstances existed. Id. at 564-65. A tribe can regulate (1) activities of nonmem-
bers who enter consensual relationships through commercial dealings, and (2) a tribe
can exercise "civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 565-66.
Thus, a shift occurred from geographically based jurisdiction to focus on tribal mem-
bership and land tenure. Montana was then used to build the subsequent decisions
removing civil and regulatory jurisdiction from tribes in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S.
438 (1997), Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001), and Nevada v. Hicks,
533 U.S. 353 (2001).
47 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
48 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000). Subsequently, in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 384 (1886), the Court had upheld the Major Crimes Act to deny jurisdiction to
the states because of the dependent status of the tribes as wards of the federal govern-
ment who needed protection from the states. "They [Indians] owe no allegiance to
the States, and receive from them no protection. Because of local ill feeling, the
people of the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies." Id. at
384.
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with the dependent status of tribes. 49 The tribes' jurisdiction has been
diminished so that only authority over members seems unquestioned.
The Court had created "zones of lawlessness" where no sovereign had
jurisdiction over misdemeanors committed on the reservation by non-
member Indians, but Congress responded with a statute to restore tri-
bal jurisdiction over such individuals.5 0  Thus, the Court has
cumulatively removed from tribes the ability to protect all persons
within their jurisdictional borders, which any responsible sovereign
should do. The Supreme Court has been reconstructing federalism to
reserve and enlarge the power of the states, which removes authority
from the federal government as well as tribes.5 1 The result is a force-
fitting of the tribes within state jurisdiction in accord with the Rehn-
quist Court's view of federalism.
The federal trust theo~ry disregards the sovereign right of tribes,
as it reflects the dominant cultural superiority combined with a land
grab unsurpassed among Western nations. Trust theory is seeded in
the Marshall Court's dicta that tribes were "wards" in relationship with
the federal guardian.5 2 Subsequent development is premised on the
presumption that American Indians, as polities and individuals, are
incapable of protecting their lands and resources. Both tribes and
Indian individuals are subject to the trust conditions imposed in fed-
eral law, Title 25 of the U.S. Code and Code of Federal Regulations.
53
Given the aggressive acts of early colonies and then successor states
with their greed for Indian lands, a protective role for the federal gov-
ernment makes sense at various historical times. Because states and
non-Indians abused the rights of Indians, obtaining federal protection
was the subject of numerous treaties between tribes and the federal
government. The federal protection was important as an inducement
49 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208; see alsoJudith V. Royster, Oliphant and its Discontents:
An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument Before the American Indian Nations Supreme
Court, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59 (2003) (describing and criticizing Oliphant and its
impacts).
50 See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 685 (1990) (holding that tribes do not have
criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on a reservation). The statute over-
turning Reina stated that the tribal powers of self-government included "the inherent
power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdic-
tion over all Indians." 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2000). The Supreme Court upheld a
challenge to the statute overturning Reina in United States v. Lara, 124 S. Ct. 1628,
1639 (2004), holding that tribal power to prosecute and punish a nonmember Indian
is inherent tribal sovereignty, not delegated federal authority, and therefore double
jeopardy is not a bar.
51 See infra note 116.
52 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
53 See Cobell v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1128, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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for tribes to "remove" themselves from lands coveted by non-Indi-
ans.54 The protection promised was not honored as the federal trus-
tee repeatedly took tribal lands for national needs (i.e., for Anglo-
Americans), most notably in the Allotment Act of 1887.55 This Act
resulted in the forced breakup of communally held tribal lands into
individual member fee allotments, with the sale of so-called "surplus"
lands for land-hungry non-Indian settlers. Altruism also motivated
this Act in the advocacy of the "Friends of American Indians" who
sought to remedy the poverty of Indians. 56 Called "the most disas-
trous piece of Indian legislation in the United States history," 57 the
Indian-held land was reduced from 138 million acres in 1887 to forty-
eight million in 1934, when the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) en-
ded allotment.58 The IRA restored the tribal governments and com-
munal land holding and included atothority for the federal
government to reacquire land for tribes to be placed in trust.59
In mainstream society, American Indians often are not perceived
as distinguished by their legal status and are caught in the backlash
movements experienced by racial minorities, women, and others.
The tribal governance power and immunity from some state laws
(e.g., some taxes) results in the American Indians being charged with
unjustifiably demanding "special rights." However, in the historical
law dialog involving American Indians this term has legal content aris-
ing from the unique political relationship with the national govern-
ment. Despite the terms in treaties that bind the United States to
tribes in critical matters like land, water, and natural resources, un-
happy non-Indians demand that tribal rights be terminated to theoret-
54 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 465 (1995)
(citing the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, art.
IV, 7 Stat. 333, 334, that promised "no Territory or State shall ever have a right to pass
laws for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of Red People and their descend-
an ts ... but the U.S. shall forever secure said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and against,
all [such] laws"). Instead of understanding the context of the treaty and using the
Indian canons of construction, the Court applied general tax law. Id. at 466-67.
55 Dawes Act of 1887, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388, 389-90 (codified as amended at
25 U.S.C. § 348 (2000)).
56 See ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN 20-22 (1966) (describing the
Friends of American Indians and the moral crusade to enact and enforce allotment).
57 CANBY, supra note 45, at 21.
58 Id. at 22. See generally Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property
Rights and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1559-71, 1603-23
(2001) (arguing that the failure of allotment rested on more than the notion that
Native Americans were used to a common ownership system).
59 See CLINTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 299 (discussing the Indian Reorganization
Act and tribal constitutions). See generally COHEN, supra note 37, at 144, on the
legislative history and enforcement history of the IRA.
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ically equalize everyone.60 Gaming on tribal trust lands has provoked
animus with demands to economically and legally disadvantage Indi-
ans. Concurrently, tribes acting as culturally-based governments are
sometimes in disaccord with the liberal vision holding constitutional
individual rights as the standard every government must meet to merit
respect. Yet, in constitutional structure and history, individual Indians
committed to membership in their tribes and to a cultural way of life
were outside the citizen status and protected rights of non-Indians.
B. Indians as Individuals: The Noncitizen "Other" in the Constitution
Individual tribal members were the constitutionally constructed
"other" because they were not citizens of the states or of the federal
political entity. They had to rely upon their tribes to protect their
interests through their tribe's relations with the national government,
primarily through treaty-making. The primary relationship tool was
treaty-making. However, the political relationship in the early repub-
lic was consolidated in the Department of War (1789-1849) .6I The
First Indian agents were in the charge of the War Department. Not
until 1849 was the Bureau of Indian Affairs transferred to the newly
created Department of the Interior.62 As "Indians not taxed," the in-
dividual members were not counted in the apportionment for con-
gressional districts. 63 In Exparte Crow Dog in 1883, the Supreme Court
described the indigenous people as
60 See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979) (construing the treaty terms in favor of the tribes' understanding
of their proportion of fish, where the state refused to comply with treaty terms for
seven tribes' right to fish on equal protection grounds of discrimination against non-
Indians); see also Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep't of Game (Puyallup III), 433 U.S. 165
(1977) (concluding that neither the Puyallup Tribe nor its members had an exclusive
right under a treaty to take fish passing through the reservation); Dep't of Game v.
Puyallup Tribe (Puyallup II), 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (holding, inter alia, that the fishing
rights of the Indian tribe, as protected by the treaty, foreclosed the Washington state
ban on net fishing of steelhead trout); Puyallup Tribe v. Dep't of Game (Puyallup I),
391 U.S. 392 (1968) (determining that the treaty between the United States and the
Puyallup Tribe protected the right to take fish in common with all citizens, but did
not prohibit the state from regulating certain aspects of fishing, provided that the
regulation meets the appropriate standards and does not discriminate against the
tribe).
61 CANBY, supra note 45, at 13; COHEN, supra note 37, at 119-20 (describing the
continuing debate on whether Indians should be transferred back to the Department
of War).
62 COHEN, supra note 37, at 119-20.
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. XIV, § 2.
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subject to the laws of the United States, not in the sense of citizens,
but, as they had always been, as wards subject to a guardian; not as
individuals, constituted members of the political community of the
United States, with a voice in the selection of representatives and
the framing of laws. 6
4
The non-citizen "other" status of Indians was continued in the
Fourteenth Amendment that expressly excluded Indians from "all
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof. '65 In 1884, in Elk v. Wilkins the Supreme Court
held that an Indian living in Omaha, Nebraska, apart from his tribe,
was not made a citizen for the Fourteenth Amendment.66 However,
the non-Indian world viewed assimilation as the solution to the "prob-
lem" of the Indians who refused to disappear,67 so the door of natural-
ization and civic status was created.
From 1884 to 1924, the Indian individual seeking naturalization
was required to prove that he or she had become "civilized." Varied
devices existed for meeting this standard. Under the Allotment Act,
the Indian who took up residence apart from any tribe and adopted
the habits of civilization would receive an allotment.6 Generally, the
individual's allotment was held in trust for twenty-five years, allowing
him to learn to manage his land and affairs. 69 Under the Act, upon
64 Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 568-69 (1883).
65 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
66 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884).
67 Outside of naturalization, the policy of assimilation was carried out by the fed-
eral trustee. See, e.g., Allison M. Duissias, Squaw Drudges, Farm Wives, and the Dann
Sisters' Last Stand: Indian Women's Resistance to Domestication and the Denial of Their Prop-
erty Rights, 77 N.C. L. REV. 637, 670-688 (1999) (describing the Dawes/Allotment Act
and the Field Matron Program to train Indian women in their proper homemaker
roles); LindaJ. Lacey, The White Man's Law and the American Indian Family in the Assimi-
lation Era, 40 ARK. L. REV. 327, 334 (1986) (discussing the remaking of the Indian
family, where women trainers were sent to reservations to teach Indian women the
Anglo-American model of homemaking).
68 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2000).
69 Id. § 348. In 1906 the Burke Act amended the Dawes Act to allow the Federal
Government to shorten the trust period for any Indian allotee "who is competent and
capable of managing his or her own affairs." See id. § 349. There was federal prefer-
ence for males, using the male "head of household" notion. See ANGIE DEBO, A His-
TORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 252 (1970). Debo described the cultural
confusion during the forced allotment of tribal lands under the Allotment Act Com-
mission scheme that allocated 160 acres for a male "head of a family," with smaller
amounts to unmarried men and children. Id.
The Indians expressed so much opposition to this alien 'head of a family'
concept-in their society married women and children had property
rights-that in 1891 the [Allotment] act was amended to provide equal
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completion of the trust period, the allotee received a fee title, thereaf-
ter subject to state law, and U.S. citizenship. In a form of race privileg-
ing, Indian women who married non-Indian men were made
citizens.7 0 Some treaties provided for means for a specific tribe's
members, more likely the male head of family, to become citizens
y. 7
Generally the processes required a renunciation of tribal culture and
traditions and behaving within the norms of the dominant society. A
statute enabling individual Indians to naturalize required the eligible
persons to abandon their tribal relations, adopt the habits of civilized
life, become self-supporting, and learn to read and write the English
language.
7 2
The individual Indians who could qualify for U.S. citizenship by
demonstrating they were "civilized" renounced tribal allegiance in a
special naturalization ceremony. Advancing the policy to assimilate
Indians into the mainstream agricultural world, there was a male and
female version of the ceremony and oath.
73 In the male ceremony he
shot his last arrow, which meant he was no longer to live the life of an
Indian. He took a "white" name, and grasped the handles of the plow.
After accepting the plow, he was told by the official administering the
oath:
This act means that you have chosen to live the life of the white
man-and the white man lives by work. From the earth we must all
get our living, and the earth does not yield unless man pours upon
it the sweat of his brow. Only by work do we gain a right to the land
or to the enjoyment of life.
74
The female ceremony was shorter and she was presented a work bag
and purse to hold. The official then said:
This means that you have chosen the life of the white woman-and
the white woman loves her home. The family and the home are the
foundation of our civilization. Upon the character and industry of
the mother and home maker largely depends the future of our Na-
tion. The purse will always say to you that the money you gain from
your labor must be wisely kept. The wise woman saves her money,
shares to all-80 acres of agricultural, 160 acres of grazing land. These
amounts were subsequently modified in agreements made with later tribes.
Id.
70 25 U.S.C. § 182.
71 GETCHES ET AL., supra note 31, at 164.
72 Id. Also, successful completion of an education at the Carlisle School for Indi-
ans resulted in a competency certificate and basis for citizenship.
73 4 SMITHSONIAN INST., supra note 2, at 233 (including historical photos of the
ceremony).
74 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, supra note 1.
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so that when the sun does not smile and the grass does not grow,
she and her children will not starve.
75
The "his" and "her" versions for individual Indians to naturalize
adhered to the white male benchmark of the dominant society of the
time. The male Indian agreed to reconstruct his life as a rational self-
maximizing white farmer, the "model" citizen of an agricultural econ-
omy. The woman agreed to serve in the model white family as a
mother and homemaker. These oaths are distinct from the general
naturalization commitment made by immigrants from other countries
who became citizens, presumably free to not become farmers or
homemakers. However, there were no other options in the view of
the dominant society if Indian individuals were to be accepted as co-
citizens.
Not until the Citizenship Act of 1924 were all Indians born within
the United States declared to be native-born citizens.76 Thus, indige-
nous individuals became citizens by statute, a vulnerable basis as com-
pared to the Constitutional mandate enjoyed by other persons born in
the United States. Theoretically, under Congress's plenary power
over Indian matters this citizenship status could be altered. Now, In-
dians are entitled to the constitutional level of individual rights and
remain the only native-born citizens of three sovereigns within the
United States' borders.7 7 The Constitution does not specify how indi-
vidual rights should to be protected for indigenous people.
75 Id. Data on how many American Indians were naturalized in such ceremonies
was not obtainable.
76 See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000).
77 Border-crossing tribes continue to face difficulties because their communities
span the borders of the United States with Canada and Mexico. The Jay Treaty of
1794 aids tribes that span both the United States and Canada. Treaty of Amity, Com-
merce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1974, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. III, 8 Stat. 116. At the south-
ern border, tribes have experienced difficulties with efforts to impose immigration
procedures on tribes for their daily life activities. In the past the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, now in the Department of Homeland Security, has tried to
make border crossing tribes use immigration authorization documents. Since Sep-
tember 11, 2001, the complications have increased. The Tohono O'odham Nation of
Tucson, Arizona, has sought a congressional act to mandate recognition of their citi-
zenship status and border crossing rights. See C.J. Karamargin, Citizenship Sought for
All O'odham, ARiz. DAILY STAR (Tucson), Feb. 13, 2003, at B2 (describing Tohono
O'Odham Citizenship Act of 2003, H.R. 731, 108th Cong.). United States Represen-
tative Raul Grijalva introduced the bill that would recognize tribal membership docu-
ments to be the legal equivalent of certificate of citizenship for all federal purposes.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL AND INDIGENOUS VISIONS OF RIGHTS,
CONTRACT, AND COMMUNITY
The old boundaries of race and gender have limits in guiding
how to guarantee treatment as an equal to each person, what Dworkin
called the heart of the Equal Protection Clause.78 The Supreme
Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas79 protecting the privacy rights of
homosexuals in intimate relationships of consenting adults extended
the measure of equality. As a society we struggle with how to construct
equal protection for all individuals. The increasingly proclaimed
identity of persons of mixed racial heritage, affirmed in the accommo-
dative methods of the national census, further renders less choate for
some purposes the race classification of equal protection law.
Individual rights constitute the heart of equality as well as the req-
uisite for consent to the social contract for a constitutional republic,
though this explanation does not fit the facts of American Indians in
the republic. The Supreme Court decisions in the voting rights area,
for instance, theoretically aim to equalize all voters in the electoral
districts to which they were apportioned. In Baker v. Carr,
80 the Court
overcame previous barriers, especially the political question doctrine,
so that the Court could decide that all voters are due a relatively equal
ability to consent to who will represent their interests and make the
laws governing the voters' lives. In the pre-Baker districts some rural
voters had greater voice in the legislatures because of unequally popu-
lated districts. This weakened the consenting ability of other voters,
for instance, the urban citizens who formed the majority of the popu-
lation in their states.
Theories of equality and consent, such as that of John Rawls,
8
typify the vision that constitutionalism engenders. The ability to con-
sent as an individual to the laws that control everyday life has been a
common theme since the breakaway of the colonies from Britain.
The Supreme Court has used the lack of consent from non-Indians
and nonmembers to tribal jurisdiction to rule that tribes lack gov-
erning authority.8 2 Because non-members are excluded from the po-
78 Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights-The Consequences of
Uncertainty, 6J.L. & EDuc. 3, 10 (1977) (responding to commentaries that Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), was decided by social science, not law).
79 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
80 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
81 SeeJOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
82 See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997) (holding that a
tribe, absent a statute or treaty, has no authority to govern non-members on a federal
highway over reservation territory); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 693 (1990) (holding
that a tribe lacks criminal jurisdiction over non-members); Montana v. United States,
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litical rights of voting and holding office within tribal governments,83
the Court has restricted the tribes' jurisdiction, though such argu-
ments have not restricted the authority of state or the federal govern-
ment over non-citizen actors within their borders.8 4 Because Rawls
has much influenced the contemporary development of the liberal
theory of individual rights, he offers a contrastive vision to the indige-
nous view. His work is considered here with appreciation of its impor-
tance for how we understand the social contract.8 5
In Rawls's theory of justice as fairness,8 6 he offers two principles
to guide the construction of the social contract:
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with similar liberty for others. Second, so-
cial and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and
(b) attached to positions and offices open to all.87
Rawls insists that the two principles are serially ordered so that
the first is always given primacy and the second may never be used to
justify compromising the first.8 8
His principles "distinguish between those aspects of the social sys-
tem that define and secure the equal liberties of citizenship and those
that specify and establish social and economic inequalities."8 9 The so-
cial contract for Rawls consists of the principles of justice initially
agreed upon by individuals engaged in social cooperation. The subse-
450 U.S. 544, 563-64 (1981) (holding that the Crow Tribe cannot regulate hunting by
non-members on non-Indian lands); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 193-94 (1978) (holding that non-Indian residents are not subject to the criminal
jurisdiction of the tribe).
83 See Strate, 520 U.S. at 445-46; Duro, 495 U.S. at 688.
84 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that the ability
of a state to exert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident depends on whether the
non-resident had sufficient contacts with the state).
85 Ann Tweedy, The Liberal Forces Driving the Supreme Court's Divestment and Debase-
ment of Tribal Sovereignty, 18 BuFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 147 (2000), provides an insightful
analysis of why liberal theory, exemplified byJohn Rawls, is inapplicable and injurious
to the tribes' exercise of sovereignty.
86 RAwLs, supra note 81, at 11-12.
[T]he name 'justice as fairness': it conveys the idea that the principles of
justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.... [T]hose who en-
gage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles
which are to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of
social benefits.
Id.
87 Id. at 60-61.
88 Id. at 61, 63.
89 Id. at 61.
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quent constitutions and a legislature-enacted laws, in accord with the
principles, become the general system of rules.90
It is critical to recognize that there are some important assump-
tions in Rawls's proposition. The first assumption is that a culture
values individual choice making to the extent Rawls states. While this
is true for many Western populations and cultures, one cannot as-
sume this for many non-Western cultures.91 Within the borders of the
United States, one cannot assume this for indigenous peoples who in
continuity with their ancestors value a communally-based system of
decisionmaking. In Rawls's world, individual choice making is the
means to obtain personal happiness. In contrast, individually based
power is not the source for indigenous communities who seek to live
in harmony and balance with other human beings as well as the natu-
ral world.
Second, in Rawls's scheme ajustice system should be built around
a fair distribution of primary social goods-such as income and
wealth, opportunities, and rights and liberties-in order to promote
happiness. To secure happiness, individuals will want to maximize
their access to goods, services, and power. According to Rawls, one
can dichotomize key aspects of society into those that secure equal
liberty and those that protect against economic and social inequality.
His priority is Western, perhaps distinctly American. 92 It enables a
materialistic measure of success, and each individual's measure of ac-
quisitive success is critical. Presumably, when some critical mass of
individuals are satisfied with their respective situations, then the larger
society can be described as successful and worthy of respect from
within and from outsiders' evaluations.
In real life, it is often impossible to take advantage of personal
liberties without some minimum measure of physical and economic
security. Besides the numerous disadvantaged populations within the
United States, in the international human rights context or the situa-
tions of less developed nations, personal and economic security are a
priority. From the point of view of people struggling in base poverty
as well as some of their governments, personal liberties such as free
speech are luxuries. Pointing this out does not mean the author sub-
scribes to the idea that the authoritarian denial of liberties is justifia-
ble because of pressing economic needs. But, we are left with
questions lacking obvious answers. For instance, how are the women
in Afghanistan and Iraq to obtain and exercise their individual
90 Id. at 13.
91 Tweedy, supra note 85, at 203.
92 Id. at 201-02.
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choices about marriage, education, and working in the full world of
occupations without some security about their physical safety? In ad-
dition, the existence of some form of economic safety net for them-
selves individually as well as for their children, partners, families, and
community is essential. The abstract boundaries and priority that
Rawls sets encounter barriers, including culture, which limit the guid-
ing force of individual rights concepts.
Rawls is explicit that his proposal for a system ofjustice as fairness
asks us to think abstractly, not in reality terms. "In justice as fairness
the original position of equality corresponds to the state of nature in
the traditional theory of social contract. ' '93 The "original position" is
not thought of as an actual historical state of affairs nor a primitive
condition of culture.
It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so
as to lead to a certain conception of justice. Among the essential
features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society,
his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune
in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence,
strength, and the like.9
4
Ann Tweedy argues that this abstract imagining engenders a Western-
ized and white position in the world:
Indeed, people of color might well feel that, without their ethnicity,
they lack the necessary reference point to make such a decision in
the initial situation. This circumstance suggests that the principles
of justice propounded by Rawls are in effect Western or white-
although Rawls and fellow white readers are unlikely to realize this
fact .... Rawls' social contract theory is a Westernized white con-
struct in that it is only feasible for whites to believe that they can
abstract themselves beyond race as is necessary to imagine oneself in
the initial situation. As Ian Haney L6pez has pointed out, the iden-
tities of people of color tend to be inextricably linked to their race
or ethnicity.
95
The Rawlsian approach is also an origin story that shapes the
principles that establish standards for establishing and protecting indi-
93 Rawls, supra note 81, at 12.
94 Id.
95 Tweedy, supra note 85, at 202 (citing STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE RE-
VEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 13 (1996) (noting that "the
characteristics of the privilege group define the societal norm" and that white privi-
lege remains largely invisible to whites)); see also LAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 157, 179 (1996) (noting that the tendency of
whites to remain blind to the racialized aspects of their identity is omnipresent, and
arguing for race consciousness to alter social beliefs).
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vidual rights. Indigenous peoples have different origin stories based
on a consensual foundation. Thus, in Rawls's philosophy a cultural
barrier exists when non-Indians encounter the indigenous peoples'
choice of consensual, not individualistic, principles for their societies.
American Indian cultures present an alternative world view, one
that values harmonious and balanced relationships with the universe
and all elements within it. The prime value is for interdependence
rather than individual rights obtained through a social contract the-
ory. Individual rights and entitlements do exist, but as a result of the
relational commitment to a community-a commitment that also im-
poses responsibilities for the members who obtain benefits. What an
individual is entitled to stems from the context of "all my relations." It
is not an abstract entitlement that precedes the individual's embark-
ing on some activity in the American Indian community. Rather, it is
from the community context that the individual roles, entitlements,
and responsibilities are derived. The indigenous world values consen-
sual decisionmaking, not a democratic "the majority wins" system.
96
The decisionmaking involves a full consideration by the participants,
including what will be due to individuals, families, clans, ceremonial
societies, officials, and their appropriate responsibilities. The partici-
pants can be the entire tribe or one's extended family, officials or
persons designated to act for others such as the heads of clans. How-
ever, all are expected to act with due regard to subject matter, con-
text, and relations at stake.
Non-Indians also advocate for a communitarian or relational ap-
proach to the principles for making just and lawful societies. Martha
Minow has reminded that rights are not neutral.97 "With them we
pick from among a variety of possible legal consequences for human
relationships and thereby influence the pattern of existing and future
relationships."98 Rather than arming each individual with his or her
abstractly conceived rights, she advocates:
Interpreting rights as features of relationships, contingent upon re-
negotiations within a community committed to this mode of prob-
lem solving, pins law not on some force beyond human control but
on human responsibility for the patterns of relationships promoted
or hindered by this process. In this way the notion of rights as tools
96 Numerous tribes have incorporated elective methods for secular officers, but
not for the leadership in cultural knowledge, what non-Indians often call religion.
97 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 308 (1990).
98 Id.
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in continuing, communal discourse helps to locate responsibility in
human beings for legal action and inaction.
99
Minow rejects the view that relational choices are inconsistent
with rights. 10 0 Rather, "[a]n emphasis on connections between peo-
ple, as well as between theory and practice, can synthesize what is im-
portant in rights with what rights miss."10' Minow's view is akin to the
American Indian view that considers rights in the community context.
What is ultimately due the individual is dependent on who and what
subject matter are affected. Contemporary tribes regularly demon-
strate that they can accommodate modern issues with decisions sus-
tained by customary principles.
10 2
Recently Peter Singer has addressed the often stated view that "all
humans are equal" and offered a utilitarian view of ethics that in-
cludes interests beyond the individual's. We must go beyond "a per-
sonal or sectional point of view and take into account the interests of
all those affected." 10 3 He propounds "a basic principle of equality: the
principle of equal consideration of interests.' 0 4 The essence of this
principle "is that we give equal weight in our moral deliberations to
the like interests of all those affected by our actions."1 0 5 Here "like"
means interests of similar centrality and weight, not views that are
identical. Singer finds as insufficient the Rawlsian view of contract as
the means to obtain justice. "The contract tradition sees ethics as a
kind of mutually beneficial agreement-roughly, 'Don't hit me and I
won't hit you."" 0 6 Singer analyzes the individual privileges or entitle-
ments some claim because of superior intelligence, race, and gen-
99 Id. at 309.
100 Id. at 382.
101 Id.
102 See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Murphy, 6 Navajo Rptr. 10 (1988). When the Navajo
Supreme Court considered the marital privilege rule, it acknowledged borrowing the
rule from the federal system. However, the court rejected one of the historical Anglo-
American principles for the marital rule: that the wife had no separate legal existence
from her husband because a marital unit was one legal party and "the husband was
the one." Id. at 12. This justification has no support in Navajo custom, which the
court called "Navajo tradition and culture." Id. at 12-13. The Navajo world is a mat-
ilineal and matrilocal society in which the woman's role is revered. Important mat-
ters in Navajo society, including individual status, identity, and some rights to
property and productive sheep herds, derive from the mother and her clan. The
Navajo Supreme Court then found cultural accord with the Anglo-American principle
to preserve the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship and denied the
marital privilege in this case. Id. at 13-14.
103 PETER SINGER, PRacrcA. ETHics 21 (2d ed. 1993).
104 Id. at 21.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 18.
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der. 107 Inequalities based on race and gender "produce a divided
society with a sense of superiority on the one side and a sense of inferi-
ority on the other."108 Singer directs our attention to the larger con-
text of all who are affected and should have a consideration of their
interests. This kind of equality works in the long term for a collabora-
tive society.
While state governments do vary in their design choices, only
tribes have used their self-determination to construct collaborative
governments outside the dominant models. This non-contract choice
subjects the tribes to continuing efforts to "remake" them in forms
approved by non-Indians.
IV. MAKING INDIANS INTO RACE AND ASSIMILATED GOVERNMENTS
A. Pushing Tribes into the "Race" Box
The continuing desires of outsiders for land, resources, and bene-
fits reserved for Indians has fueled litigation and legislative proposals
to push Indians into the "race box." Presumably, then non-Indians
can prevail under arguments based on equal protection or that state
governments can have more authority over tribes. Undeniably, tribal
membership is both biologically and culturally based. To view "Indi-
anness" only as a racial category denies the centuries of values that
created distinct cultures, with customs and practices. While individual
tribes are distinct in how their values are lived in everyday life, there is
a shared perspective that interdependent relationships are the foun-
dation for a community.
The design of tribal government, the laws and tribal court system,
language retention, and ceremonial obligations are derived from be-
liefs and behaviors that define the indigenous culture. Ideally, indi-
viduals are protected through duties that community members owe to
each other and that maintain the social, economical, governmental,
and sacred culture that are the fabric of each tribe. Retaining the
customary values, that is, the guides to behavior in the "ought-to do"
and "ought-not-to do" sense, is challenging work for the tribal sover-
eigns as contemporary governments. 10 9 Like all governments, they
strive to provide the basic services and protections for their citizens
and others within their jurisdiction.
107 Id. at 20-22.
108 Id. at 44.
109 See the University of New Mexico School of Law Tribal Law Journal, at http://
tlj.unm.edu, the only on-line journal that focuses on law made within indigenous na-
tions in the United States and internationally.
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Tribes insist that their law systems should be distinct from states
and not be subordinate to the state in matters internal to their reser-
vations. In Williams v. Lee, in 1959, the Supreme Court established an
Indian law principle that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be governed
by them." 10 In Williams, a non-Indian sued an Indian for a transac-
tion occurring on the Navajo reservation. In rejecting the state claim
for jurisdiction, the Court stated: "It is immaterial that respondent is
not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an
Indian took place there. The cases in the Court have consistently
guarded the authority of Indian governments over their
reservations.""
In contrast to Williams, recurring in American Indian legal his-
tory are the challenges in Congress and the Courts that would make
American Indians into a racial, not political, category, assimilated into
state and federal law regimes. The continuing attacks from some
members of Congress and anti-Indian advocates focus on proposals to
make Indians a race, terminate tribal sovereignty, terminate the
tribes' sovereign immunity, terminate all treaty rights or make tribes'
municipal-type governments subordinate to the state. 112
In 1974, the Supreme Court rejected the race-based attack on In-
dian status in Morton v. Mancari, where it held that individual Indians
enjoy their rights not as a race, but as members of a political entity: a
110 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (holding unanimously that state courts had nojuris-
diction over a civil claim by a non-Indian against an Indian for a transaction arising
on the Navajo reservation).
111 Id. at 223.
112 An example is the American Indian Equal Justice Act, S. 1619, 105th Cong. § 2
(1998), introduced by Senator Slade Gorton, which would have waived the sovereign
immunity of Indian tribes to suit in federal courts for alleged Indian Civil Rights Act
violations, permitted states to sue tribes in federal courts to collect taxes on the sale of
goods or services to nonmembers, and subjected tribes to state court jurisdiction for
torts and contract actions. Senator Gorton continuously pursued bills to terminate
authority or rights that tribes have under the federal common law and treaties. For
other Gorton-proposed bills, see Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The
Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 488-89 (1998). Senator
Gorton's proposed acts were a continuation of the type of legislation introduced on
behalf of persons discontent with the status and authority of tribes. Also, the pro-
posed Native Americans Equal Opportunity Act, H.R. 13329, 95th Cong. (2d Sess.
1978), in order to fully subject Indians to state jurisdiction, would have directed the
President to abrogate within a year all treaties with Indians and would not have pro-
vided compensation for loss of the property or sovereignty resulting from the loss of
treaty rights terminated under the bill.
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federally recognized tribe. 113 In Mancari, non-Indian employees of
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) unsuccessfully challenged as im-
permissible discrimination the Indian preference in hiring and pro-
motions enacted in the IRA of 1934.114 Since the Williams and
Mancari decisions, as tribes exercise governmental authority to regu-
late non-Indians on tribal lands and establish tax-exempt enterprises,
individuals and some state and local governments as non-Indians have
challenged these regulations as racially impermissible "special rights."
Prolific scholarship continues to question and, in some instances, ar-
gue for overruling, Mancari and other cases as impermissible racial
discrimination.115
The historical effort to "force fit" the American Indian govern-
ments and their members into the state and federal scheme have in-
tensified in the current Supreme Court's efforts to expand state power
and protect the interests of states.1 16 In realigning the state and fed-
eral powers under the Constitution, the Court has also removed
power from Congress, notably under restrictive interpretations of the
113 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
114 Id. at 555.
115 Williams, in Indians as Peoples, supra note 6, at 776, analyzes the Supreme
Court's treatment of Indians and states that the Court has not adequately explained
how Indian law raises no serious issues under equal protection when the Indian is
partially racial. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 6, at 173, however, while acknowledg-
ing that Williams raises genuine problems of congressional and judicial discomfort
with the special status of Indians, finds that Williams's approach underemphasizes
that Indians are uniquely entitled to special federal measures. See Williams, Sometimes
Suspect, supra note 6, at 192, for the response to Goldberg-Ambrose's critique of Indi-
ans as Peoples.
116 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995), which opened the series
of cases where the Supreme Court found that Congress lacked the authority to pass
expansive acts-in Lopez the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. Then followed Semi-
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996), which held that the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act was constitutionally invalid because the Eleventh Amendment prohib-
its tribes from suing states in federal court without their consent. In subsequent cases
the Court found that Congress acted outside its power under the non-Indian com-
merce clauses and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v.
S.C. Port Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747-48 (2002) (holding that the Federal Maritime
Commission cannot adjudicate private party complaints against the state because of
the Eleventh Amendment); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360
(2001) (holding that the Americans With Disabilities Act exceeded Congress's author-
ity under Section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment, and therefore cannot abrogate states'
immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (holding that provi-
sions in the Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congressional authority under
the Interstate Commerce Clause and violated the Fourteenth Amendment); Kimel v.
Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 65-66 (2000) (holding, similar to Garrett, that the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act cannot abrogate states' immunity).
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Interstate Commerce Clause. The enlarged state jurisdiction in this
Court's vision of federalism has invaded tribal boundaries and subject
matter.' 17 Because tribes and their members insist on a distinct cul-
tural way of life, they are also disfavored by two other decisional orien-
tations of the contemporary Supreme Court. First, the Court insists
on "color-blind" law so that affirmative laws protecting racial minori-
ties are disfavored. 118 Second, the Court's use of Anglo-American
"tradition" as the means "of aligning norms of constitutional interpre-
tation with mainstream values" have reduced protection for
nonmajority groups, for instance, in First Amendment rights.11 9 The
Lawrence case invokes some of the elements involved in how American
Indians are treated by the dominant society and the Court. The Law-
rence case has saliency because gays and lesbians insist that their dis-
tinctness be acknowledged and protected in the law.120 Thus, in
Lawrence the Court had to overrule Bowers v. Hardwick, where the
Court deferred to what it viewed as mainstream traditional values hos-
117 Culminating the cases eviscerating tribal jurisdiction are the especially destruc-
tive decisions in Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 374-75 (2001) (holding that a tribal
court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate a civil rights tort action claim involving a state
official's execution of a search warrant on reservation land to search for evidence of
an off-reservation poaching crime), and Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645,
649 (2001) (holding that a tribe lacked authority to impose a tax on a nonmember
guest). See also David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of
States'Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 273 (2001)
(analyzing the Rehnquist Court's apathy towards Indian Law); Sarah Krakoff, Undoing
Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and Tribal Sovereignty, 50 Am. U. L.
REv. 1177, 1179 (2001) (describing the Supreme Court's use of narrow rulings to rule
against tribes); Valencia-Weber, supra note 24, at 467-80 (exploring the conse-
quences of this expanded state power on Indian law).
118 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 203 (1995).
119 Getches, supra note 117, at 321; see also Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 890 (1990) (denying protection to the use of peyote in a Native American church
and reducing the standard of review where a generally applicable law burdens relig-
ion); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (holding that the application
of Air Force dress code to prevent an Orthodox Jew from wearing a yarmulke as re-
quired by his religion was constitutional under a more deferential standard of review
in military cases).
120 It matters that despite the vociferous animus towards homosexuality, the Court
affirmed a constitutional principle protecting privacy in intimate adult relationships.
While intimate relationships of Indians are not an issue of this Article, those relation-
ships were a focus of past federal law regimes that punished behaviors deemed mor-
ally unacceptable under federal law when those activities were not generally part of
federal enforcement for non-Indians. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or.
1888) (holding that the Secretary of the Interior has authority to issue regulations
that punish an Umatilla woman for living and cohabiting with a man not her
husband).
[VOL. 8o:1
OLD AND NEW STRAINS AND AMERICAN INDIANS
tile to the equality of homosexuals.121 When American Indians chal-
lenge state jurisdiction over tribal governing power, tribes face non-
Indian litigants who challenge Indians' rights as "special rights" violat-
ing equal protection. Treaty-based rights are ignored or denied as
binding in such challenges. As long as American Indians insist on
maintaining their cultural way of life with traditions that sharply con-
trast with those of the mainstream, they face disfavor in the Court's
reconstruction of federalism.
Efforts to assimilate Indians into state governmental regimes
overlap with a push to hold operative tribal governments to the consti-
tutional constraints to which states agreed, but not thie tribes. This is
another form of assimilation for the American Indians in their govern-
mental capacity.
B. Making Tribes into Constitutional Governments:
The Indian Civil Rights Act
The push to make tribal governments into generic Euro-Ameri-
can polities, subject to the same constitutional constraints as non-In-
dian governments, resulted in the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) of
1968.122 The Act has the dual purpose of protecting "persons" subject
to the authority of tribal governments with most of the usual constitu-
tional rights and of protecting the autonomy of tribes to exercise au-
thority in culturally-based governments. 123 While the Act included
most of the Constitution's Bill of Rights, it excluded some that would
interfere with the culturally-based governance or would burden the
limited financial resources of tribes. The exclusion of the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment is an explicit recognition that
tribes are theocratic. 124 In opposing the ICRA, tribes, especially the
121 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
122 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2000). A helpful and complete analysis of this act is
Donald L. Burnett, Jr., An Historical Analysis of the 1968 'Indian Civil Rights' Act, 9
HARV.J. ON LEGIs. 557 (1972).
123 See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978).
124 Id.; Burnett, supra note 122, at 591-92. Omitted are the First Amendment
provision for the establishment of religion, the Seventh Amendment requirement for
jury trials in civil cases, the Sixth Amendment requirement of appointment of counsel
for indigents in criminal cases, the Second Amendment on bearing arms and a well
regulated militia, and the Third Amendment on quartering soldiers in private homes.
Modifications include the § 1302(8) guarantee of equal protection of the tribal laws,
not "the laws" in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment; no Fifth Amendment re-
quirement of a grand jury indictment for a tribal criminal prosecution (while most of
this Amendment's protections were retained); and § 1302(7), which invokes the
Eighth Amendment by prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and excessive bails,
but sets a limit of six months imprisonment and $500 fine on tribally imposed penal-
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Pueblos of New Mexico, insisted that their customary governments
were successful functioning models not in need of improvement by
foreign values and structures. 125
Before and after the ICRA, tribes have adopted constitutions. 12 6
The IRA as implemented policy generated a boiler plate model of a
constitution that many tribes adopted. 127 In the twentieth century,
many tribes replaced the generic IRA constitutions. Tribes continue
to evolve as responsive governments facing modern needs. Some have
incorporated the ICRA protections into tribal law to complement the
indigenous forms of protection for the individual. 128 A tribe adopting
the ICRA internally because of its compatibility is significantly differ-
ent from the law being externally imposed.
The cultural disparity inherent in the imposition of the ICRA
generated Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez in 1978, when the Supreme
Court upheld the Pueblo's law on membership qualifications over an
individual rights claim. 129 Julia Martinez, a tribal member, charged
her tribe with violating her right to equal protection in the ICRA be-
cause of gender discrimination in the tribe's membership ordi-
nance. 130 The 1934 IRA is the companion in contradiction with
individual rights as it revitalized the tribal power to set internal stan-
dards for membership and for the control and allocation of tribal
land and resources. The litigation revisited what had been historical
problems at Santa Clara Pueblo: individual claims to the communal
land, often by non-members, in challenge to the tribal government's
cultural system to protect resources for the community.
Martinez is the only construction of the ICRA by the Supreme
Court. The case remains controversial and is among the most cited
cases in American law. 13 ' The Martinez facts present concretely the
theoretical claims of constitutional individual rights, invoking equal
protection from gender-based discrimination, in conflict with the col-
lective political right of the Santa Clara Pueblo. As a sovereign, it ar-
gued for its interest in a culturally-based system of law, expressed in its
ties. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000). These limits were subsequently amended to sentences
not exceeding one year's imprisonment, a $5000 fine or both. Id.
125 Burnett, supra note 122, at 589, 601, 614.
126 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 309-14 (discussing the IRA and tribal
constitutions).
127 CANBY, supra note 45, at 24-25, 62-65.
128 CLINTON ET AL., supra note 31, at 309-14; McCarthy, supra note 112, at 488-89.
129 Martinez, 436 U.S. at 49.
130 Id. at 51.
131 It has been cited in some twenty Supreme Court decisions, over 460 federal
court cases, and over 450 law review articles. Search of WESTLAW, Keycite Service
(Sept. 16, 2004).
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constitution and ordinance enabled by the IRA. The response to Mar-
tinez in 1978 and since roils in the criticism of mainstream feminists,
scholars of the Constitution and federal courts, advocates who want to
make tribes conform to the federal standard for all constitutional
rights, and supporters of tribal sovereignty who want to reconcile the
political right with a federal remedy for individuals caught in distres-
sing conditions such as those in the Martinez case. The case illustrates
the tension between the status of tribes as political actors, governing
the lives of members and others within their reach, and the liberal
striving for core individual rights to be universally guaranteed.
V. SANTA CLARA PUEBLO V. MARTINEZ: TESTING CULTURAL DisPARTY
A. The Supreme Court Constructs the ICRA to Protect
Culturally-Distinct Governments
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez captures the cultural tension in the
ICRA's dual purposes to protect individual members with constitu-
tionally modeled individual rights while protecting the tribes' right to
culturally-distinct systems of government. 132 Julia Martinez charged
the Santa Clara Pueblo with gender discrimination because its 1939
ordinance denied Pueblo membership to the children of female
members who married outside the tribe, but not to similarly situated
children of male members who married non-members.1 33 The plain-
132 See Rita Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(forthcoming 2004); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty-
Five Years of Disparate Cultural Visions: An Essay Introducing the Case for Re-argument Before
the American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 14 KAN J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming
2004). These articles result from initial research and are part of a long-term project
by the two authors to study the Martinez case. Research will use internal Santa Clara
viewpoints and materials as well as external materials not addressed in other law re-
views. The materials studied include the transcript of the Federal District Court trial
as well as the historical background of the Pueblos in New Mexico, including the
documents of the Spanish, Mexican, and American territorial periods in New Mexico.
Publication in the University of Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy arises from the
Tribal Law and Governance Conference held at the University of Kansas on October
11, 2003.
133 Martinez, 436 U.S. at 52. The ordinance is as follows:
Be it ordained by the Council of the Pueblo of Santa Clara, New Mexico, in
regular meeting duly assembled, that hereafter the following rules shall gov-
ern the admission to membership to the Santa Clara Pueblo:
1. All Children born of marriages between members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo shall be members of the Santa Clara Pueblo.
2. All Children born of marriages between male members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo and non-members shall be members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo.
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tiffs, Julia and her daughter Audrey, claimed, under the ICRA, the loss
of equal protection and deprivation of property without due process
of law. 134 The ordinance restricted Julia's "land use rights and other
material benefits and rights which she could give to her children if
they were recognized as members. 1 35 The affected children would be
denied political rights; material benefits, especially land use rights;
and other entitlements.
136
The case invoked issues surrounding tribal sovereignty, sovereign
immunity, and constitutional standards for equal protection and due
process. The district court held that the Pueblo's sovereign immunity
had been waived by Congress in the ICRA. On the merits, the District
Court decided for the Pueblo, finding that criteria for membership
was traditionally used by Santa Clara and did not violate the ICRA.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the merits because
the ordinance violated the equal protection of the ICRA. 13 7 While the
Tenth Circuit found it unnecessary to apply the Fourteenth Amend-
ment standard with full force, the court found that if the equal protec-
tion clause of the ICRA was to "have any consequence, it must operate
to ban invidious discrimination of the kind present in this case." 138
The Santa Clara Pueblo offered insufficient facts to establish a com-
pelling interest: namely the Pueblo and its cultural survival would suf-
fer absent the ordinance. The "relatively recent origin" of the
discriminatory ordinance did not merit being considered as "vener-
able tradition.'
39
The Supreme Court's decision, by Justice Marshall affirming tri-
bal sovereignty, set the framework for the ICRA where the well-estab-
lished federal "policy of furthering Indian self-government" could
outweigh the objective of strengthening the position of individual
members vis-d-vis the tribe. Only a limited use of habeas corpus could
3. Children born of marriages between female members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo and non-members shall not be members of the Santa
Clara Pueblo.
4. Persons shall not be naturalized as members of the Santa Clara
Pueblo under any circumstances.
Id. at 52 n.2. The Martinez mother and daughter challenged parts 2 and 3. Martinez
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 540 F.2d 1039, 1041 (10th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
134 They sued as individuals and on behalf of the class of individuals affected in
their situation as mother and child. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 51 n.3.
135 Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 402 F. Supp. 5, 15 (D.N.M. 1975).
136 Id. at 14.
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intrude on the Pueblo's culturally-based self-governance.' 40 The
Pueblo could set the rules for its own membership, even if the chil-
dren of a Pueblo mother and a father from outside the Pueblo were
denied the benefits of membership. The Court's affirmation of tribal
sovereignty is important because the analysis connected the statutory
design to a respect for indigenous custom and tradition that underlie
the tribal law. Individual rights could not trump customary rules. If
federal courts adjudicate these civil actions, then the federal judiciary
"may substantively interfere with a tribe's ability to maintain itself as a
culturally and politically distinct entity."
141
The affirmance of tribal sovereignty, sovereign immunity, and the
narrow role in habeas for federal court review strengthened the
sources critical for the development of modern tribes. Besides the
ICRA there are other statutes and Supreme Court decisions that limit
the tribe's sovereignty. For instance, in criminal law, the Major
Crimes Act removed jurisdiction over felonies committed on the res-
ervation from tribes and states. 142 Nonetheless, Martinez is a law arse-
nal for tribes holding off attacks from parties and states who would
destroy their governance and self-determination.
143
B. Some Non-Indian Responses to the Martinez Decision
The Court's perspective on culturally-based governance was wel-
comed by tribes, but not by some vociferous external viewpoints. The
Martinez decision was criticized and denounced by voices spanning
the political landscape from feminists to interest groups who had long
advocated the termination of tribal sovereignty. A sampling reveals
140 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58-72 (1978) (noting that the
ICRA was intended to protect tribal sovereignty from "undue interference").
141 Id. at 72.
142 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000). States can obtain criminal jurisdiction if Congress
has expressly permitted, as in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162 (2000), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322
(2000), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000), which provide designated states with civil and
criminal jurisdiction. States who obtained civil and criminal jurisdiction under these
provisions are commonly called "PL 280" states, after Public Law 83-280, 67 Stat. 588
(1953), authorizing the state authority.
143 In attempting to remove the destructive impact of cumulative decisions from
the Supreme Court, especially after Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2002), the tribes
have had to reconsider whether they can compromise the Martinez protections for
their governments in order to obtain restored jurisdiction in their territories. NA-
TIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS & NATIVE AMERICAN RIGHTS FUND, 2003 LEGIS-
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the nature of the critics' concerns as well as the gap between Pueblo
culture and the external worldview.
Especially noteworthy is the response of Catherine MacKinnon, a
leading feminist scholar in law, who found Martinez "a difficult
case." 144 "Why is excluding women always an option for solving
problems men create between men? I want to suggest that cultural
survival is as contingent upon equality between women and men as it
is upon equality among peoples."' 45 MacKinnon's "essentialism" ap-
proach to feminism provoked its own criticism for its narrowness that
ignores cultural and racial experiences that are inseparable in the
lives of ethnic minority women. 146
The voices of American Indian feminists have generally not been
invoked in analyzing Martinez.147 Rayna Green, a Cherokee feminist,
articulates a commonly shared viewpoint among Indian feminists:
For Indian feminists, every women's issue is framed in the larger
context of Native American people. The concerns which character-
ize debate in Indian country, tribal sovereignty and self-determina-
tion, for example, put Native American tribes on a collision path
with regulations like Title 9 and with Equal Opportunity and Affirm-
ative Action. Tribes insist that treaty-based sovereignty supersedes
any other federal mandate. 148
While American Indian feminists acknowledge that contempo-
rary Indian life includes inequities for males and females, and be-
tween males and females, they anchor the resolution process within
the tribe and its own cultural practices. 149 It is not impossible for ex-
ternal authority and means to be helpful, but it is a tribal community's
choice about their value in the constructing of culturally-congruent
problem solving.
144 CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 66 (1987).
145 Id. at 68.
146 E.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 593 (1990). Harris's article in turn provoked a critique of the MacKinnon
and Harris viewpoints by an Indian law scholar. See Robert Laurence, A Quincenten-
nial Essay on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 307, 315-18 (1992).
147 But see Gloria Valencia-Weber & Christine P. Zuni, Domestic Violence and Tribal
Protection of Indigenous Women in the United States, 69 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 69, 88-96
(1995) (presenting Indian feminist voices).
148 Rayna Green, Native American Women, 6 SIGNS 248, 264 (1988); see also Rayna
Green, The Pocahontas Perplex: The Image of Indian Women in American Culture, 16 MASS.
L. REV. 698 (1975) (describing how the image and stereotypes of Indian women have
been shaped through time).
149 See the comments from Indian feminists in Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note
147, at 92-93, discussing contemporary Pueblo changes in women's roles.
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Other outsiders showed little hesitation about their ability to un-
derstand and interpret the Santa Clara's culture and history. Some
joined MacKinnon's view that the ordinance could not be the result of
the enduring culture of the Santa Clara people, but of the infectious
ideology of patriarchy with which Euro-Americans had corrupted the
customary law of the Pueblo. Judith Resnik raised thoughtful discus-
sion about the federal system's capacity to tolerate the differences in
cultural governments of the tribes.150 The recurring questions re-
main: how much difference will be tolerated within the federal and
state system? How much similarity to the Anglo-American forms of
government will defeat the claim to cultural distinction? How can fed-
eralism accommodate the indigenous need to remain independent of
state and federal regimes?15 1 Resnik, however, questioned whether
the Santa Clara Pueblo could be considered a culturally and politically
distinct entity given the extensive history of federal influence on tribal
governments. "The 'Santa Clara Rule' is intertwined with United
States' rules and culture."1 52 She concluded that the discrimination
against women historically built into federal law made it easier for the
Supreme Court to validate the Santa Clara government's choice.
53
Other critics would have the tribes held to one constitutional
standard of equal protection promised to all American citizens. For
instance, Robert C. Jeffrey invokes a natural rights theory of constitu-
tional rights and concludes that in
denying a remedy to Julia Martinez and her daughter, for denying it
for the reason it did, on the basis of cultural and tribal distinction,
the [Supreme] Court itself became guilty of that 'ancestral discrimi-
nation,' in direct contradiction to the founding principle of human
equality in the Declaration of Independence.
154
Some critics of Martinez are supportive of tribal sovereignty, but
unable to accept the result in Martinez. Indian law scholars debate
ways, such as a proposed ICRA amendment, to provide a remedy for
the Martinez family while preserving the sovereignty of tribes to gov-
ern over their members and territory. Robert Laurence, for instance,
150 E.g., Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal
Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 671, 701-02 (1989).
151 Id. at 750.
152 Id. at 726-27.
153 Id. at 727.
154 Robert C. Jeffrey, Jr., The Indian Civil Rights Act and the Martinez Decision: A
Reconsideration, 35 S.D. L. REv. 355, 371 (1990); see also Lucy A. Curry, A Close Look at
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Membership by Sex, by Race, and by Tribal Tradition, 16
WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 162 (2001) (urging tribes to reject sexist and racist criteria for
membership and identity).
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advocates that Congress overrule Martinez in a congressional act that
would protect tribal authority. 55 He acknowledges tribal sovereignty
has been historically damaged and requires a correction, so that tribes
can function as successful modern governments. 15 6 However, plain-
tiffs like Mrs. Martinez would then have a real individual right to equal
protection and a remedy, as promised in the ICRA. Laurence would
require limits in the legislation that are sensitive to tribal concerns
and would limit the outside impact on government processes and re-
sources. Laurence would prescribe that an ICRA plaintiff must ex-
haust tribal remedies; a meaningful amount in controversy should be
required; sovereign immunity should protect the tribe against money
damages, though an Exparte Youngtype remedy could apply.157 More-
over, federal court review should be on the tribal court record if possi-
ble, and the political question doctrine should be applied liberally. 158
C. Presumptions and Omissions When OutsidersJudged Santa
Clara Culture
Significant presumptions mark the critiques that ignore the legal
history of Indians in the republic and specifically of Santa Clara
Pueblo. Among the most disturbing are:
1. The Presumption that All Tribes Have Similar Laws so that the
Ordinance of Santa Clara Warrants a Substantive Federal
Statute to Prevent Gender Discrimination 159
Tribes use their sovereignty in ways as varied as the tribes. For
example, the law of the Onondaga Tribe of New York treats male
members who marry non-members like Santa Clara Pueblo does the
female members. 160 A child's identity and entitlements, including an
allocation of land from the communal holdings, derive from the
mother's clan. After Onondaga students entered the non-Indian high
155 Robert Laurence, Martinez, Oliphant and Federal Court Review of Tribal Activity
Under the Indian Civil Rights Act, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 411, 427-31 (1988).
156 Id. at 427-38.
157 See generally Markus G. Pruder & John A. Veil, The Discrete Charm of Cooperative
Federalism: Environmental Citizen Suits in the Balance, 27 VT. L. REV. 81, 89-90 (2002)
(analyzing an appellate court's decision that state sovereign immunity provided
shielding power from federal court jurisdiction).
158 Laurence, supra note 155, at 434-36.
159 Carla Christofferson, Note, Tribal Courts' Failure to Protect Native American
Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE L.J. 169, 170-71 (1991).
160 See The Winds of Change: A Matter of Promises (PBS Video 1990) (providing
an informative presentation on this Onondaga law and presenting two other tribes
and their form of cultural governance).
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school in town, "outmarriages" increased. On March 26, 1974, the
governing Council of Faith Keepers affirmed customary unwritten law
to pass the tribal law. 161 In the Onondaga tribe, governing authority is
shared by women and men and is vested in a clan system. Clan
Mothers appoint the individual male Faith Keepers who serve on the
governing council. If the Faith Keeper fails to properly serve the in-
terests of the community, the Clan Mother can remove him. The
1974 law on outmarriage is still in effect, as it aimed to strengthen the
clan system where women are the key.'
62
Onondaga governance challenges the presumptions that under-
lie the contemporary theory of individual consent to government
power. Recall MacKinnon's statement about males settling their dis-
putes by disadvantaging females. In the Onondaga tribe, an all male
council passed the law disadvantaging the male members who married
outside the tribe. The commitment to retaining a viable culturally-
based system of law and life motivated the Faith Keeper Council and
its constituents. In this age where the democratic model with elections
is pushed in international policy by the U.S. government, it is worth
pointing out that the Onondaga chose to live otherwise. No one votes
for the Clan Mothers nor for the Faith Keepers who serve on the gov-
erning council that enacts the laws. The Onondaga have insisted on
their independence from federal control and accept no federal grants
or programs. 163 To educate its children in customary beliefs and prac-
tices, the tribe operates its members-only school from kindergarten
until eighth grade so that its youth are prepared before entering ex-
ternal mainstream schools. Onondaga law on membership is insepa-
rable from the culture that guides the governance.
The objections to any gender preference, whether the Santa
Clara's or the Onondaga's, intrinsically involves a denial of the indige-
nous right to a culturally-distinct form of governance. The toleration
of diverse ways of defining a community and its member entitlements
tests the majority society in ways not foreseen. Since the earliest Su-
preme Court decisions, the mainstream world has harbored expecta-
tions that tribes as distinct societies would disappear. 164 It is not
known how many tribes favor male and female lineage in membership
161 Id.; Telephone Interview with Wendy Gonyea, Communications Officer, Onon-
daga Nation (Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Gonyea Interview].
162 Gonyea Interview, supra note 161; see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 132.
163 Gonyea Interview, supra note 161.
164 See, e.g., Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 468 (1984) ("Consistent with prevail-
ing wisdom, Members of Congress ... believed to a man that within a short time-
within a generation at most-the Indian tribes would enter traditional American soci-
ety and the reservation system would cease to exist.").
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requirements, but that is not the critical concern regardless of what
data could reveal. The primary concern here is whether individual
members can maintain or alter a gender-based rule for their distinct
polity, despite the displeasure this causes the external world. Protec-
tion of this political right is the subject of numerous treaties, statutes,
and agreements between tribes and the national government.
Promises, formalized in law, were made to Indians to secure their
lands and resources for non-Indians. The United States cannot claim
to be a society of laws and justice if the protection of tribal govern-
ments were to disappear because non-Indians now have the lands and
resources obtained through legal relationships.
2. The Presumption that Outsiders Can Determine Some
Historical Set-Point at Which a Tribe's Culture Can Be
Authenticated for Evaluating What Deviates from the
Customary
This view ignores the history of indigenous peoples who have
continuity because they engaged in conservation of custom and inno-
vation that responds to changed circumstances. 165 The presumption
is that concepts from Western societies, like patriarchy and matriar-
chy, can validly be used to analyze and understand any indigenous
culture. In the Martinez case at the district court trial, the views of
established scholars on Pueblo culture and their respected scholar-
ship, such as Alfonso Ortiz (a member of San Juan Pueblo) 166 and
Edward P. Dozier (also a member of Santa Clara Pueblo) ,167 were
muted. They describe a world organized around six moieties (socie-
ties), not on parental lineage. 168 A "bilateral" or "dual organization"
world was structured around "Winter People" and "Summer People"
165 See Peter Iverson, Taking Care of the Earth and Sky, in AMERICA IN 1492, at 85, 107
(Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. ed., 1992).
They had to balance the duty to live in the proper way and conserve the
good of the past with the need to incorporate changes that could ensure the
continuity of one's people. If they borrowed certain elements from other
societies, they could make such additions their own over time. And over a
still more extended period these innovations could become well enough em-
bedded in the culture to be considered traditional.
Id.; see also Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L.
REv. 225, 256-61 (1994) (discussing the use of conservation and innovation).
166 See ALFONSO ORTIZ, THE TEWA WORLD (1969).
167 See EDWARD P. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO INDIANS OF NORTH AMERICA (1970).
168 ORTIZ, supra note 166, at 3-11.
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who had designated duties to the community.169 Nonetheless, a domi-
nant voice in the trial was that of Dr. Florence Hawley Ellis, a noted
non-Indian anthropologist who disagreed with the analysis and direct
knowledge of Ortiz and Dozier.17°1 Dr. Ellis testified that Santa Clara
was patrilineal and that women played a minor role in the Pueblo's
religious ceremonies-the responsibility of the moieties. 171 The trial
transcript reveals recurring instances where the Pueblo witnesses as
well as outsiders could not make legal or anthropological categories
fit the testimony describing everyday life among the Santa Clara. Cau-
tion is certainly warranted when selecting expert sources (Indian and
non-Indian) on indigenous cultures.
3. The Presumption that an Outsider's Presumption Is Valid Even
When Formed Without Historical Information
The Santa Clara Pueblo, since the arrival of the Spanish in the
sixteenth century, has suffered losses of communal land to outsiders
who used various devices (including marriage to Pueblo women) to
extract fee title parcels for themselves. For indigenous peoples, land
is not real estate; it is the primary source for the specific features of
culture and the identity as a Pueblo member. An ordinance to pro-
tect the land base, arguably, is intrinsically cultural. Both the Santa
Clara and Onondaga laws determine who is allocated the use and pos-
session of land. This is not a fee title, though it includes other rights
of property such as leasing and inheriting.
Various theories were offered under the regimes of Spain, then
Mexico, and the United States sovereign, for extracting land from the
Pueblo communal lands. 172 Non-Indian citizens of the three sover-
eigns at various times proffered that they had obtained Pueblo mem-
bership through marriage to a Santa Clara member, then sought
169 Id. at xii ("[T]he basic feature of the Tewa social organization was a division
into 'Summer People' and 'Winter People' and a further tendency to fit various as-
pects of Tewa culture into this dual pattern."); see also Swentzell, supra note 132.
170 At the Martinez district court trial, Ortiz refused to testify for either side and
Dozier had died about three years before the trial. Hill acknowledged her disagree-
ment with Ortiz and Dozier on this matter. See Tim Vollmann, Revisiting Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez: What Can We Learn Thirty Years Later?, 29 FED. BAR Ass'N INDIAN L.
CONF. 65 (2004). Vollmann was one of the attorneys representing Julia Martinez at
the district court trial thirty years earlier. See also Valencia-Weber, supra note 132
(discussing testimony at the trial).
171 Vollman, supra note 170, at 67.
172 See generallyJOE SANDO, PUEBLO NATIONS 104-22 (1992) (describing the "habit-
ual trickery" that severed land from the New Mexico Pueblos, including invalid land
claims and counterfeit official documents).
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emancipation from Pueblo membership and governance with an ac-
companying fee title for the land worked within the communal land
holding. 173 Historically there were always nonmembers (many non-
Indians or "Anglos") occupying Pueblo land without Santa Clara con-
sent.174 Then, to the appropriate outsider sovereign (Spain, Mexico,
or the United States), these persons would invoke adverse possession
as the basis for their claim for individual fee property to be extracted
from the communal land base. Adverse possession was the theoretical
basis for the 1924 Pueblo Lands Act, passed by Congress to resolve
long standing claims by non-Indians. 175 This history of struggle is
missing from the federal court decisions and the criticisms of the Mar-
tinez decision. However, understanding the experiences behind the
1939 ordinance, even if one disagrees with the rule, is essential in ac-
knowledging the inherent cultural connection to land for the Santa
Clara Pueblo.
4. The Presumption that the Universal Value of Individual Rights
Transcends Any Experience and Worldview that Indigenous
People Have Used to Construct Their Societies
A constitutional model of equal protection that insists that males
and females must be treated exactly the same is incompatible with the
complementary roles for men and women that tribes have con-
structed. Many Indian women have political power as heads of gov-
ernments that is unmatched in the non-Indian world, such as the Clan
Mothers in Onondaga. This presumption also ignores the indigenous
nations' pattern of conserving customary values while innovating to
meet changed circumstances and needs.
173 See the case of Roque Conjuebes, who in 1744 petitioned the Spanish Govern-
ment to emancipate him from the obligations imposed by the Santa Clara Pueblo on
members and to award Conjuebes a fee title to the lands he had worked and pos-
sessed within the communal lands. Em Hall, Land Litigation and the Idea of New Mexico
Progress, in SPANISH AND MEXICAN LAND GRANTs AND THE LAW 48 (Malcolm Ebright
ed., 1988); see also EDWARD P. DOZIER, THE PUEBLO INDIANS OF NORTH AMERGCA 21,
106-14 (1970) (describing the Conjuebes case and the land problem in New Mexico
generally).
174 SANDO, supra note 172, at 114 ("[A]n investigation by the Sixty-seventh Con-
gress... disclosed that there were approximately three thousand non-Indian claim-
ants to lands within the boundaries of the pueblo grants, aggregating about twelve
thousand persons.").
175 Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, ch. 331, 43 Star. 636 (repealed 2000); SANDO, supra
note 172, at 114-22 (describing the proposals for the Pueblo Lands Act and adjudica-
tions of claims by the Pueblo Lands Board (1925-1938), in whose work the Pueblo
Indians "came out losers").
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In accord with cultural values, many tribes have entrusted women
to be the head of their nations, something that the United States has
not managed to do. Wilma Mankiller, past Principal Chief of the
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, is only one of the many executives
found among the over 550 federally recognized tribes.17 6 Moreover,
some Pueblos of New Mexico, often described as the most traditional
and conservative of the indigenous societies in the United States, have
also changed their governance rules. The Namb6 Pueblo and Isleta
Pueblo have elected women Governors, Lela Kaskalla and Verna
Teller, respectively. 1 77 Laguna Pueblo has changed its requirements
for offices and women can now hold some leadership positions.1 7 8 In
making the changes to their system of government, these Pueblos
have reached to their cultural principles for guidance and used inter-
nal processes, rather than external theories and forums like federal
courts.
In responding to its community, the Santa Clara Pueblo tribe has
a committee studying the membership ordinance and its impact.
179
The members of this committee include one of the original defend-
ants and children of Santa Clara women who were directly affected
and disqualified from formal membership by the Martinez decision.
The Santa Clara Pueblo, along with other indigenous nations of the
United States, continues to practice conservation and innovation so
that it can be a successful twenty-first century government.
CONCLUSION
The political status of American Indian tribes as sovereigns can-
not encompass them in the usual constitutional dialogue about indi-
vidual rights. The history of the nation-to-nation relationship in
which tribal nations made treaties with the federal government re-
mains the starting point with viability in contemporary law. Cases
built on treaty rights are part of the twenty-first century law in the
United States.
Moreover, the historical treatment of American Indian individu-
als as the non-citizen "other" still affects their everyday lives. No other
176 See Valencia-Weber & Zuni, supra note 147, at 91-94.
177 Female Pueblo Leaders Honored, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Mar. 13, 2004, at E3 (describing
ceremony to honor Lela Kaskalla, past Governor of Namb4 Pueblo and Verna Teller,
past Governor of Isleta Pueblo by the New Mexico Commission on the Status of Wo-
men and the Indian Pueblo Cultural Center).
178 Vincent Knight, Past and Present: Women and the Leadership Positions in the
Pueblo of Laguna (2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Notre Dame Law
Review).
179 See Swentzell, supra note 132.
2004]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
discretely identified set of citizens has the body of law in Title 25 of
the federal statutes and regulations that control personal and collec-
tive lives. Thus, American Indians pose a dilemma for those who seek
to achieve a liberal vision of constitutional individual rights exercised
as a universal standard. Yet, many individual rights advocates would
also seek to collaterally support the collective right of American Indi-
ans to sovereignty and self-determination.
To the extent these two streams of rights can be reconciled, this
effort must start with an accurate perception of the status of American
Indians who are more than "race" in the constitutional dialogue.
In numerous settings tribal governments are collaborative part-
ners with the state and federal governments on matters of common
concern. There are hundreds of compacts and agreements on public
safety, protecting natural resources, protecting children, and many
types of subject matter where geographically contiguous sovereigns
share responsibility for the benefit of many. These mutually benefi-
cial arrangements are some of the ways that the rights of individuals
are acknowledged and protected. Yet such relationships require re-
specting rather than interfering with the culturally-based laws in tribal
self-governance. The cultural differences demand much from Indians
and non-Indians if they are to achieve their espoused goal of provid-
ing fair and just government to all who are affected.
Given the unique status of American Indians, it is not possible for
individually-based rights of tribal members to adequately protect and
maintain the critical right of tribal sovereignty and self-determination.
Certainly, it is critical that individual members enjoy rights as citizens,
voters, and as persons protected by state and federal laws against invid-
ious discrimination in education, employment, and the arenas in
which all citizens are participants. However, the electoral power of
American Indiansa80 is insufficient for what is at stake for tribes. Polit-
180 According to the 2000 Census, American Indian and Alaska Native Persons,
self-identified as one race, are 2,475,956 (0.9%) of the total 281,421,906 person popu-
lation. When combination with another race is counted, the American Indian and
Alaska Native population rises to 4,119,301 (1.5%) of the total population. U.S. CEN-
sus BuREAu, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, PROFILES OF GENERAL DEMOGRAPHIC CHARAC-
TERISTICS, 2000, tbl. DP-1 at 1 (2001). Voting rights of American Indians do matter.
The electoral role of American Indians in specific states is very important; e.g., the
election of Senator TimJohnson has been attributed to the votes of American Indians
in South Dakota. See Adam Cohen, Indians Face Obstacles Between the Reservation and the
Ballot Box, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2004, at A18. The elections for Governor in New
Mexico have clearly been affected by the American Indian vote. Governor GaryJohn-
son was elected when Democrats ignored the Indian interest in gaming and tax issues.
Current Governor Bill Richardson has intensely maintained cooperative relationships
with the nineteen Pueblos and three non-Pueblo tribes in New Mexico.
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ical voice alone cannot protect against the evisceration of tribal sover-
eignty that the Congress and the Court have authorized.
Non-Indians, especially those in public office where policies and
laws are made that affect the "first" Americans within our borders,
must more accurately view American Indian nations and their mem-
bers. This involves more than acknowledgement of the historical ex-
perience. It means discarding mythical accounts of European
conquest and refocusing on the past and present political role of
tribes in the United States. American Indian nations, through trea-
ties, contributed their lands and resources to the construction of the
American republic. Indians are contributors to the productivity of the
national society while they maintain their cultural identity. The suc-
cess of tribes as contemporary governments needs non-Indians to de-
velop an overdue recognition that American Indians are a distinct and
valuable part of the republic.
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